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I.  Introduction
 In the United States, homeownership cre-
ates numerous benefits for individuals, families 
and society and is the cornerstone of the “Ameri-
can dream.”  Low foreclosure rates of residential 
mortgages and the stigmatism associated with the 
term foreclosure are indicative of the value that 
Americans put on owning their homes.  Howev-
er, the rate of mortgages entering the foreclosure 
process during the 2nd quarter of 2007 was 0.65%. 
This rate is the highest in history, up seven ba-
sis points from the first quarter, twenty-two basis 
points from 2006 and showing no signs of a de-
crease (Ackerman, 2007).  Below, Figure 1 shows 
the percentage of homes that were in foreclosure at 
the end of the quarter from 1995 to 2007.  Figure 1 
illustrates how the current number of foreclosures 
is close to surpassing the foreclosure totals seen 
during the post September 11th recession.
 Although still a small percentage of all 
mortgage originations, defaults and subsequent 
foreclosures are large in absolute numbers and 
produce crushing losses to lenders and investors, 
higher finance costs to consumers, and devastat-
ing damage to borrowers and homeowners direct-
ly affected.  The entire macroeconomy is begin-
ning to feel the effects with the real possibility of 
increased unemployment due to a recession that is 
imminently looming.  This paper analyzes factors 
that cause borrowers to default on their mortgages 
and lose their homes to foreclosure.  
 National foreclosure proceedings have 
been inflated by significant increases in Califor-
nia, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona.  These markets 
are dominated by investor loans, which are loans 
to buyers who do not plan on living in the houses. 
Nationally, home prices have fallen by 3% caus-
ing investors to abandon their mortgages, driving 
up foreclosure rates.  These markets are also dom-
inated by subprime loans:  deals offered by lend-
ers to borrowers with blemished credit histories 
that have higher rates of interest.  During this pe-
riod of subprime lending, underwriting standards 
were lowered and new affordability products such 
as extra-long term, interest only mortgages, and 
loans with low teaser interest rates that balloon af-
ter a few years (hybrid mortgages) were offered 
(Ackerman, 2007).  While more than a third of all 
subprime adjustable rate loans are in the previous 
four Southern states, Ohio and Michigan are two 
Midwestern states contributing to the foreclosure 
problem.  These troubles are driven by economic 
problems created by job losses in the manufac-
turing and the auto industries (Ackerman, 2007). 
Many lenders, such as Countrywide Financial, 
have suffered enormous losses after late payments 
and subsequent defaults mounted.  General Mo-
tors, the world’s largest carmaker, is in danger of 
having to take a $1 billion charge to cover bad 
mortgage loans of its subsidiary, Residential Cap-
ital (“Subprime”, 2007).
 Thanks to problems in the subprime mort-
gage sector, the subsequent decline in housing 
construction and sales has had an immediate eco-
nomic impact.  A number of real-estate agents, 
mortgage brokers, investment bankers, movers, 
painters, contractors, landscapers, etc. are expe-
riencing lower wages and even losing their jobs. 
Because home sales and moves stimulate purchas-
es of appliances, electronics, and furniture, giant 
chains like Home Depot and Sears have reported 
sales down around 5%.  In addition,  auto sales 
were down 12% in July 2007 from the previous 
year and consumers reported falling home equity 
and rising mortgage payments as a main reason 
why (Gross, 2007).  
 With all of this damage being done to the 
economy, an important question needs to be asked: 
What are the key determinants causing the current 
record number of foreclosures?  To answer this, 
the study will use the most recent national foreclo-
sure data and attempt to find a model with results 
that can be interpreted to suggest potential policy 
implications.  Section II of the paper describes 
literature on the topic of foreclosures and related 
theory.  Section III and IV explain the data and then 
lay out an empirical framework, respectively.  The 
model includes traditional determinants of fore-
closure, current lending practices, and economic 
conditions.  With the modeling framework laid 
out, Section V discusses the results from estima-
tion of the model.  Finally, Section VI presents a 
detailed summary of the findings, possible policy 
implications and avenues for future 
research.
II.  Review of the Literature and 
Theoretical Model
  Many studies throughout 
the late 20th century have looked 
at the determinants of foreclosure. 
Traditionally, these determinants 
have included unemployment rates, 
change in interest rates, loan-to-
value ratios, and home price appre-
ciation.  In addition, most studies 
have been able to look at the micro 
side of the housing issue.  Howev-
er, data sources will force my study to take a more 
national level approach.  In addition to looking at 
more of the national side of the problem, I will 
examine a couple of new, untested variables as de-
terminants of foreclosure and use the most recent 
foreclosure data.  
 Two complementary theories, option theo-
ry and the ability-to-pay model, can best explain 
the underlings of the current foreclosure problem. 
The basic premise of the option-based model is 
that borrowers have the option to default on their 
mortgage during each payment period (Quercia, 
2005).  Borrowers believe they can benefit from 
clearing the value of their mortgage off the books 
and gain free rent in their home between the time 
they default and the actual event of foreclosure. 
The negatives of defaulting and going through 
the foreclosure process for the borrower include 
giving up the house, costs of moving, losses of 
attachable assets, lower credit rating, and any psy-
chological or moral costs of defaulting (Hender-
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Figure 1:  % of Loans in Foreclosure at End of Quarter
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shott, 1993).  
 Option theory stresses that when inter-
est rates are declining/rising, borrowers have the 
strong incentive to default/not default, especially 
in regions where house prices are declining/rising 
(Elmer, 2007).  If home values fall sufficiently, 
borrowers will “ruthlessly” exercise their option 
to default (Cutts, 2005).  The likelihood of default 
increases as the market value of equity declines, 
which occurs if either mortgage value increases or 
property value decreases (Archer, 2002).  Howev-
er, even when in the money, borrowers may delay 
or refuse the default option although it makes fi-
nancial sense to do so, hoping the option becomes 
even “deeper in the money” (Quercia, 2005; Pen-
nington-Cross, 2006).  These borrowers either 
believe the negatives of defaulting outweigh the 
costs or believe the volatility in the market could 
make foreclosure even more attractive in the fu-
ture.  
 A second theme of option-based models 
is that prepayment and default are “competing” 
risks.  If one option is exercised, the other op-
tion is terminated.  The option to prepay, a call 
option, will be exercised when the borrower can 
get a better deal on an interest rate after financing 
costs.  Competing options are especially relevant 
now because prepayment penalties are common 
with adjustable rate mortgages.  The proportion 
of subprime loans with prepayment penalties has 
increased from about 50 percent in 1998 to 80 per-
cent in 2000 (Quercia, 2005).   Therefore, this fac-
tor limits a borrower’s ability to call a mortgage 
and refinance to a lower rate. 
 When dealing with the option to default 
and go through foreclosure, interest rates have a 
substantial impact.  When interest rates are in-
creasing, the cost of borrowing money increases 
so foreclosures should increase, ceteris paribus. 
However, it is likely that there is a lag between the 
time the interest rate increases and the time when 
foreclosures becomes amplified.  Adjustable rate 
mortgages are likely to come with teaser rates, 
below market interest rates, for a short period of 
time and then will adjust to the higher market rate. 
Therefore, the borrower is not likely to foreclose 
until the interest rate jumps after a span of a few 
years.  
 In addition to option-theory of default, 
another common reason that individuals default 
on mortgages is due to “trigger events.”  This 
view is characterized by the ability-to-pay model 
which says a mortgagor will default whenever the 
mortgagor’s current income after expenditures 
falls below the amount of payment to mortgage 
principal and interest (Barth, 1983).  As defined 
by Elmer, trigger events are “unanticipated short-
falls in income such that income is no longer suf-
ficient to meet periodic debt obligations” (2007). 
The sudden change then “triggers” default on the 
mortgage.  Therefore, income and expense-related 
shocks such as job loss, divorce, or a death in the 
family may lead to insolvency and mortgage de-
fault. 
 Higher unemployment rates should be an 
acceptable proxy for labor market conditions and 
the chance that the borrower himself faces this 
situation.  Danis and Pennington-Cross used un-
employment rates lagged one month as a proxy 
for trigger events and found surprisingly that fore-
closures and unemployment are inversely related 
(2005).  This result differs from theory and natural 
intuition.  In addition, divorce can be a major fi-
nancial stressor especially when alimony or child 
support payments are involved.  With the addi-
tion of a second house, living expenses tend to 
increase dramatically without any corresponding 
increase in wages.  However, while the divorce 
rate doubled between 1965 and 1976, it has since 
varied by less than 10% and would not appear to 
be a determinant causing the most recent increase 
in foreclosures (Henderschott, 1993).  
 An issue that is related to trigger events is 
the financial risk posture of households.  Individu-
als choose their preferred level of savings and in-
surance to meet those unexpected shocks or “trig-
ger” events.  The likelihood that a trigger event has 
a severe negative impact becomes greater as the 
individual’s savings or insurance decreases.  For 
example, a lender might foreclose on one home 
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and not another if the foreclosed home’s owner 
has less readily available savings.  The theory of 
financial risk posture suggests a possible interac-
tion between savings and unemployment rates 
and their impact on foreclosures.  In the United 
States, consumer debt has reached historical highs 
while the personal savings rate is at all-time lows 
(Elmer, 2007).  This recent trend of an extremely 
low savings rate may be having a vast impact on 
today’s record foreclosures.  
 On top of foreclosures caused by trigger 
events, many argue that lenders are part of the cur-
rent problem because of the recent development 
of “predatory” lending tools.  Lenders and bor-
rowers have the option of using fixed-rate mort-
gages, adjustable-rate mortgages, hybrids of the 
two, among other options.  Adjustable-rate mort-
gages (ARMs), sometimes referred to as a preda-
tory lending instrument, first appeared after the 
financial deregulation of 1980 and have quickly 
become a popular mortgage alternative. In 1994 
during a period of rising interest rates, 39% of all 
mortgage originations were ARMs (Ambrose La-
Cour-Little, 2005).  After the ARM share dropped 
to around 10% during the late 1990’s, it shot back 
up into its 1994 range during the start of the new 
millennium.  Below, Figure 2 shows the trend of 
homebuyers financing through adjustable rate 
mortgages.
 Consumers are attracted to the lower ini-
tial interest rates of the ARM relative to fixed-
rate mortgages.  For example, ARMs may be 
especially attractive if they allow homebuyers to 
have lower initial payments in areas where hous-
ing prices have appreciated rapidly (Merry, 2006). 
Buyers may also be attracted to an ARM if they 
don’t expect to live in the house for a very long 
time frame.  The buyer may take advantage of 
the low teaser interest rate, hope that home val-
ues increase in the short term, and then sell the 
house and cash out the increase in equity before 
the teaser rate is increased after the initial two or 
three-year period.
 Lenders like the ARM because it puts the 
interest rate risk squarely on the borrower.  This 
is a cost advantage to lenders who can then offer 
lower rates to borrowers who accept a limited pe-
riod of payment stability either because they don’t 
plan to live in the house for long time or because 
they are comfortable bearing the interest rate risk 
(Ambrose Lacour-Little, 2005).  Because of the 
interest rate risk borne by borrowers in the face 
of rising interest rates, one would expect that an 
increase in ARMs relative to fixed rate mortgages 
would increase foreclosures.  
 In addition, record gas prices may be hav-
ing a negative impact on individuals’ ability to pay 
mortgage payments.  In recent years, national gas 
price averages have shot skyward due to unrest in 
the Middle East, hurricanes, and increased global 
demand.  This has caused a decrease in discretion-
ary income.  Due to American’s inelasticity with 
respect to gasoline in the short-run, individuals 
may face the choice of fueling up their vehicles 
and heating their houses or paying their mortgage 
payments on time.  Some individuals may opt for 
putting off the mortgage payment, hoping and bet-
ting that the bank won’t foreclose on their home. 
This study hypothesizes that as national gas prices 
increase, the number of foreclosure will also in-
crease.  
 Finally, past research has indicated the 
presence of several other possible determinants. 
The most direct measure of equity in a home is 
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, which measures 
the amount of the loan divided by the value of the 
property (Elmer, 2007).  Theory would indicate 
that as LTV decreases, that is as the amount of the 
loan decreases relative to the market value of the 
home, foreclosure rates decrease.  Homeowner 
equity is also affected by the rate of appreciation 
in house prices.  High home appreciation acceler-
ates the buildup of equity by reducing the current 
LTV (Elmer, 2007).  However, while the national 
housing price index may be increasing to show 
positive growth in house value, some borrowers 
may be still at risk of losing their homes due to 
regional housing market price declines (Henders-
chott, 1993).  Overall, as the rate of home appre-
ciation increases, foreclosures should decrease, 
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ceteris paribus.
 Some supply and demand theory is also 
involved in the current foreclosure crisis.  With so 
many houses available on the market, builders and 
potential sellers have to slash prices.  These lower 
aggregate prices are causing problems for borrow-
ers who have home equity loans or were hoping to 
“flip” the home, renovate it quickly and sell for a 
profit.  Nationally, house prices have fallen by 3% 
and the amount of unsold homes has risen to the 
equivalent of a 10-month supply, so selling one’s 
home to cover the loss is nearly impossible.  It is 
easy to see and acknowledge the enormous prob-
lems that are rampant in the economy currently 
and understand how they could become even 
worse in the near future (“The Hammer”, 2007).
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Most of recent literature on foreclosures focuses 
specifically on the subprime mortgage market. 
The subprime market has rapidly expanded dur-
ing the last 20 years.  The most typical impairment 
of these borrowers is a poor credit history; others 
have limited or no documentation on their income 
or provide no down payment (Danis, 2005).  Spe-
cifically, Capozza and Thompson find that sub-
prime loans delinquent for 90 days are more than 
twice as likely to be foreclosed on as prime loans 
(2006).  Recent research on the subprime market 
and the increased lending to this area has been 
extensive and complex. Due to the complexity of 
the issue and the cost of accessing data related to 
subprime lending, this study will not focus on this 
segment of the problem. 
III.  Data
 The data used in this study are obtained 
from a variety of sources that cover the time pe-
riod starting with the first quarter of 1995 and end-
ing with the second quarter of 2007.  LoanPer-
formance.com provides services detailing many 
mortgage statistics and provided the data on fore-
closures used in this study.  I will use a quarterly 
measure of the percentage of all loans in foreclo-
sure at the end of the period for the United States 
Mortgage Banker’s Association:  National Delin-
quency Survey default.  
 One key determinant this study looks at is 
the effect of the type of mortgage on subsequent 
foreclosures.  To measure this, I have gathered 
data on the percentage of loans originated dur-
ing a quarter that are adjustable rate 
mortgages.  Once a month, as part of 
the Weekly Primary Mortgage Market 
Survey, Freddie Mac collects the ARM 
share of applications, as reported by 
lenders who participate in the survey. 
It is assumed that the rest of the per-
centage originated can be considered 
fixed rate mortgages.  I have composed 
these ARM share figures into quarterly 
measures.
 Mortgage interest rates were 
also collected from Freddie Mac and 
include both 30-year fixed rates and 1-year ad-
justable rate mortgages.  Freddie Mac’s Primary 
Mortgage Market Survey also surveys lenders 
each week on the rates and points for their most 
popular 30-year fixed-rate, 15-year fixed-rate, 5/1 
hybrid amortizing adjustable-rate, and 1-year am-
ortizing adjustable rate mortgage products.  The 
survey is based on first-lien, prime conventional 
conforming mortgages with a loan-to-value of 80 
percent.  The interest rate spread and ARM mov-
ing average used in this study were composed 
from this survey.
 To measure the volatility of interest rates, 
I will use the standard deviation in the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR index).  The LI-
BOR is the rate of interest at which banks offer to 
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lend money to one another in the wholesale mon-
ey markets in London. It is a standard financial 
index used in U.S. capital markets and is the index 
that is used to set the cost of various variable-rate 
loans. Lenders use such an index to adjust interest 
rates as economic conditions change. Changes in 
standard deviation of the LIBOR index will show 
any shocks and volatility in interest rates.  
 Other measures of data come from various 
sources.  The measure of housing prices comes 
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) that publishes a quarterly 
House Price Index (HPI).  Data on national unem-
ployment rate (Bureau of Labor), national savings 
rate (US Department of Commerce), and average 
retail gas prices (US Department of Energy) were 
obtained from various government bureaus.  All 
of the above data was in weekly or monthly form 
and will be converted into quarterly measures for 
the purpose of this study.  
 Finally, a measure of loan-to-value will 
not be included because data on LTV ratios are 
difficult to obtain on the national level and is bet-
ter suited for microanalysis.  The use of the quar-
terly House Price Index should be an acceptable 
proxy for the measure of changes in the equity of 
American housing.  Below, Table 1 provides de-
scriptive statistics on the dependent and explana-
tory variables used in the model.
IV.  Empirical Model
 In order to best explain the determinants of 
foreclosure, I will use the following independent 
variables defined in Table 2:  percentage share of 
mortgage originations that are ARM, interest rate 
spread, moving average of 1-year adjustable inter-
est rate, ARM interest rate volatility, house price 
appreciation, national unemployment rate, na-
tional savings rate, national retail gas prices, and 
savings and unemployment rates interaction.  The 
dependent variable in my study is the quarterly 
percentage of homes in the United States in the 
foreclosure process.  
 I expect to find a positive sign for ARM 
share because recent lending practices have creat-
ed an environment where lenders offer relatively 
lower “teaser” rates on adjustable rate mortgag-
es.  These teaser rates are priced at below market 
interest rates for a period of two to three years. 
Then the rates reset to the market rate, which is un-
doubtedly higher, creating more costly mortgage 
payments.  If the environment is such that interest 
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rates are rising overall, 
when the adjustable 
rate becomes fixed af-
ter the period of two 
or three years and is 
readjusted to a higher 
market rate, mortgage 
payments will shoot 
upward and the like-
lihood of default and 
eventually foreclosure 
will increase.  This po-
tential impact on fore-
closures is most likely 
to be seen after a lag of 
two or three years.  It is 
unlikely that many in-
dividuals will want to 
default on a mortgage 
priced at a discount, but will be more likely to de-
fault when the interest rate on their loans becomes 
much higher after the introductory, low teaser rate 
period. 
 To look at the effect of interest rates on 
foreclosure, I will examine three components:  the 
interest rate spread, adjustable mortgage interest 
rate average, and the volatility of ARM rates.  In 
my model, I will include the interest rate spread 
between the prevailing 1-year ARM rate and the 
30-year fixed rate to proxy for the benefits of 
switching from one type to the other.  To measure 
the effects of interest rates, I will simply use a 
moving average of the ARM interest rate encom-
passing the last four quarters.  Moving averages 
are a good tool to smooth out short-term fluc-
tuations, thus highlighting longer-term trends or 
cycles.  Using the last 4 quarters should allow a 
large enough passage of time to account for read-
justments of ARM into the changing market rates. 
Finally, I will test the impact volatility of interest 
rates has on foreclosures by using the standard de-
viation of the LIBOR rate over the period.   
 The percent of unemployed workers as 
provided by the Bureau of Labor is used as a 
proxy for the impact of trigger events.  I would 
expect the sign on this variable to be positive indi-
cating that higher national levels of employment 
are correlated with higher rates of foreclosure. 
This relationship should be seen after a lag in time 
because one would expect that individuals have 
some savings to continue to make mortgage pay-
ments for a period of time after incurring job loss. 
In theory, banks would not necessarily foreclose 
immediately, but would instead wait and hope the 
unemployed individual could rejoin the work force 
and resume making mortgage payments.  For that 
reason, I will lag the unemployment variable one 
quarter.  
 I expect the signs on both the national sav-
ings rate and house price appreciation measure 
to be negative.  As national savings increases, 
people should have more in reserve if a trigger 
event does occur or their mortgage payment does 
increase.  However, as consumption increases rel-
ative to saving, the likelihood of a trigger event 
or increased mortgage payments having a detri-
mental effect increases.  Like the unemployment 
rate, I expect the national savings rate to have a 
lagged effect on foreclosures, so the variable will 
be lagged by one quarter.  
 Likewise, as the national House Price In-
dex (HPI) increases, the relative value of Ameri-
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cans’ homes increase.  This increases the equity in 
homes and lowers the relative value of the mort-
gage and should lower the propensity to default 
and have one’s mortgage foreclosed.  However, 
exceptions can occur with both savings and house 
price variable on a regional level as home prices 
and savings rate do vary based on location and 
preferences.  Again, the impact of the HPI may 
be significant after a lag as it takes a while for ho-
meowners to realize significant changes in home 
equity.
 Finally, the sign on the gas price variable 
is expected to be positive.  As national gas prices 
increase, less money is available for individuals 
to spend in other areas, including mortgage pay-
ments.  This is due to Americans’ current inelas-
ticity of demand on gasoline.  Because so many 
Americans rely on their vehicle for transportation 
to and from work, school, family, events, etc., it is 
not easy to just lower gasoline consumption when 
prices increase.  The added cost to buy gasoline 
and related products could adversely lead families 
into foreclosure.  
 This study will test the hypotheses below 
by using the equation: 
Foreclosure rate = f(ARM share, Unemployment 
rate, Interest Rate Spread, Interest Rate Moving 
Average, Interest Rate Volatility, House Price Ap-
preciation, National Savings Rate, National Retail 
Gas Price)
1.  As the ratio of ARM to FRM loans increases 
(ARM share), foreclosures will increase.  
2.  An increase in unemployment rates (lagged) 
will increase the number of foreclosures.
3.  An increase in national savings rate (lagged) 
will decrease the number of foreclosures.
4.  As housing appreciates nationally, the number 
of foreclosures will decrease.  
5.  As national retail gas prices increase, foreclo-
sures will increase.  
V.  Results
 The regression results, presented in Table 
3, show mixed results in relation to my testable 
hypotheses.  Table 3 presents the effects of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable 
(foreclosures).
 Models A and B show the results from 
my two best regressions.  The results show that 
foreclosures are dependent on the lagged share of 
adjustable rate mortgages originated, current un-
employment, moving average of adjustable mort-
gage rates, and the house price appreciation index 
lagged one year. Personal savings rate, interest 
rate spread, and ARM 
interest rate volatility 
were not found to be 
significant determi-
nants of foreclosures 
by my model.  Gas 
price was found to be 
significant in a few of 
the regressions, but its 
results were anything 
but robust.  Therefore, 
all of the above vari-
ables were removed 
from Models A and B.
 All of the coef-
ficients in Table 3 have 
the predicted sign and 
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are significant at least to x=0.1.  The difference in 
lag time of the ARM share is what makes up the 
difference in Model A versus Model B.  Model A 
contains an ARM share lag of two years, while 
B uses a lag time of three years.  Model A yields 
an adjusted R-squared value of 0.680, indicating 
that 68.0% of the variation in foreclosures is ex-
plained by the model.  Model B explains 78.0% of 
the variation in foreclosures.  The variable coef-
ficients in Model B are slightly stronger than in 
Model A and the adjusted R-squared is signifi-
cantly higher, both of which further the argument 
that a three-year lag in ARM share origination ex-
plains a greater number of foreclosures.  
 Through the results shown by the coef-
ficient on the interest rate moving average vari-
able, one can see that an increase in the interest 
rate increases the number of foreclosures.  At first 
glance, this result appears to be in conflict with the 
hypothesis generated by option theory that states 
borrowers will want to default when interest rates 
are falling not rising.  However, option theory as-
sumes a fixed-rate mortgage, which would give 
buyers incentive to default when interest rates are 
declining, much the same as a company has the 
incentive to call bonds back when interest rates 
fall below the coupon rate.  However, my empiri-
cal model is set up so mortgages are assumed to 
be adjustable-rate.  Therefore, the borrower does 
not hope for rising interest rates because that will 
only result in higher mortgage payments. 
 However, the ability-to-pay model and 
more specifically, the impact of trigger events on 
foreclosures were supported by the results of this 
study.  As current unemployment rates increase, 
more people are unable to meet their mortgage 
payments and subsequently have their homes 
foreclosed.  Also, my results agree with the work 
done by Elmer who found that when home prices 
are appreciating, less people have their homes 
foreclosed due to increased equity build-up.
 One potential problem with my data se-
ries is the possibility of autocorrelation occurring 
in the models.  Autocorrelation will often arise 
when time-series data is used, as is the case in this 
study.  The Durbin-Watson test is the most com-
mon way to test for autocorrelation.  After running 
the Durbin-Watson test on Model B, it shows that 
this model is narrowly within the test limits, and 
autocorrelation is not present.  However, the test 
showed that autocorrelation is present in Model A. 
When the Prais-Winsten test was used to correct 
Model A for autocorrelation, both the ARM share 
and House Price Appreciation variables were no 
longer significant.  Because the only difference 
between Models A and B is the difference in ARM 
share lag time, Model B with the three-year ARM 
share lag continues to look like the best represen-
tative model for the determinants of foreclosure. 
 In relation to my five testable hypotheses, 
I have found mixed results.  The results involv-
ing ARM share, unemployment, and house price 
appreciation variables came out virtually as pre-
dicted.  
1.)  An increase in the ARM share originated will 
cause foreclosures to significantly increase in 
three years.
2.)  An increase in the national unemployment 
rate will have an immediate, significant impact on 
foreclosures.
3.)  An increase in the HPI index will cause fore-
closures to decline.
 This study predicted that the increase in 
foreclosures would be seen after a lag in the in-
crease in the unemployment rate.  However, the 
increase is seen immediately as the current rate in-
creases.  This suggests the immediate devastation 
a recession could cause on the housing market and 
the lives of those who do lose their income due to 
job reductions.  Finally, the impact of a change in 
the HPI index on foreclosures was not as immedi-
ate as predicted, but significant after a one-year 
lag.  This result makes sense because it takes time 
to realize gains in equity.
 On the other hand, the two other hypoth-
eses did not turn out as predicted.  
1.)  The national, personal savings rate does not 
have a significant impact on the number of fore-
closures.
2.)  Retail gas prices do not have a significant im-
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pact on the number of foreclosures.  
 While my study hypothesized that the im-
pact of unemployment on foreclosures would be 
lagged, the impact of unemployment was signifi-
cant immediately, suggesting a possible interac-
tion between unemployment and the low current 
national savings rate.  Because the national sav-
ings rate is so low, Americans do not have an ad-
equate supply of funds to fall back on when they 
lose their jobs.  Therefore, I tried to model this 
possibility by creating Model C which contains 
all the variables previously found significant and 
adds in (Savings)(Unemployment), which is an 
interaction term that multiples the current unem-
ployment rate with the current national personal 
savings rate.  Table 4 shows the results when 
Model C was run using an OLS regression.
 As Table 4 shows, all variables are still 
significant at the 0.05 level and all coefficients are 
similar to previous models.  Model C explains an 
impressive 81% of the variation in foreclosures 
and is not influenced by autocorrelation.  The new 
(Savings)(Unemployment) interaction variable is 
negative and significant.  This suggests that unem-
ployment’s positive influence on foreclosures is 
mitigated when unemployment is interacted with 
an increase in national savings rates.  This sup-
ports the theory of financial risk posture that says 
a trigger event, namely job loss, will have a much 
smaller effect on an individual’s financial health if 
they have a relatively greater amount in reserves 
such as savings. 
 While the national savings rate alone did 
not turn out to be a significant determinant in hous-
ing foreclosures in this study, I would not discount 
its possible impact on the economy in the future. 
Unless future savings rates differ greatly from the 
current trend, they could have a significant impact 
on the housing market and entire economy in the 
near future due to the possible interaction with un-
employment shown in Model C.  The same can be 
said for retail gas prices.  Again, while not found 
to be significant in this study, current prices al-
most daily reach all-time inflation adjusted highs. 
If this trend continues, the impact could hamper 
the economy, specifically the housing market in 
the near future.
VI.  Conclusions
 The findings of this study extend the previ-
ous research done on the determinants of foreclo-
sures, specifically with the result of ARM share. 
The results indicate the significant, negative im-
pact that adjustable rate mortgages can have on 
the housing market and economy.  Many market 
analysts have described these adjustable interest 
rate lending tools as “predatory.”  The results of 
this study would tend to support that claim.  Fu-
ture regulation needs to address the problems with 
adjustable-rate mortgages including the low teaser 
rates and balloon payments.  Adjustable rate mort-
gages have and will continue to cause problems 
for homeowners unless they are addressed by 
government regulation.
  In addition, this study found that unem-
ployment has a significant, positive effect on fore-
closures.  This result goes along with theory and 
natural intuition but against the results found by 
a previous study done by Danis and Pennington-
Cross.  This study also found a potential interac-
tion effect between savings and unemployment 
rates on foreclosures.  The result of this interac-
tion would indicate that in a country such as the 
United States with low savings rates, a recession 
could have more devastating effects on the econ-
The Park Place Economist, Volume XVI
Bryan Duling
55
omy, especially in the area of home foreclosures, 
than in a country with relatively higher savings 
rates.
 Future research dealing with the problems 
associated with adjustable-rate mortgages is vi-
tal.  This study did not even touch on the current 
problems in the subprime housing market.  Both 
of these areas contain infinite possibilities for re-
search.  Possible work comparing and contrasting 
the housing markets of different regions in the 
United States or the determinants of foreclosure 
between rural and urban areas could bring about 
interesting results. 
 Finally, the sample size of data used in 
this study was relatively small.  Results could be 
enhanced using monthly as opposed to quarterly 
data to increase the number of observations.  This 
could be fairly easy to accomplish if one has ac-
cess to monthly foreclosure data as that was the 
one variable in this study that was exclusively 
available in quarterly form.  
 Foreclosures have become an enormous 
problem not just for individual families but also 
for the entire well being of the United States econ-
omy.  Understanding the determinants of foreclo-
sures is vital to protect both individuals and the 
economy from the negative consequences this is-
sue triggers.  Today, a recession looms due in large 
part because of the housing crisis.  The emergence 
of a recession in the United States would exacer-
bate problems in the housing market that in turn 
could initiate a vicious, circular pattern.
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